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ACTUALITÉ DU RENSEIGNEMENT

PRIVATISATION DU RENSEIGNEMENT
ET DE LA SÉCURITÉ

FORCES ET OPÉRATIONS SPÉCIALES

GUERRE DE L'INFORMATION

CYBERMENACES

TERRORISME

PROLIFÉRATION ET TRAFIC
D'ARMES

CRIMINALITÉ ET MAFIAS

CONFLITS ARMÉS

RISQUES INTERNATIONAUX

-  pdf
-  livre
-  article
-  podcast

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ACTUALITÉ DU RENSEIGNEMENT

Budget Request For National Security Space Activities

The National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), which builds, launches and operates the nation's intelligence satellites, has been unusually active over the past year. The full record of the March 15 hearing provides an unclassified overview of national security space programs.

National Security Letters: Proposals in the 112th Congress

National Security Letters (NSLs) are roughly comparable to administrative subpoenas. Various intelligence agencies use them to demand certain customer information from communications providers, financial institutions, and consumer credit reporting agencies under the Right to Financial Privacy Act, the Fair Credit Reporting Act, the National Security Act, and the Electronic Communications Privacy Act.

This report reprints the text of the five NSL statutes as they now appear and as they appeared prior to amendment by the USA PATRIOT Act (to which form they would be returned under S. 1125 and H.R. 1805). Related reports include CRS Report R40138, Amendments to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) Extended Until June 1, 2015, by Edward C. Liu, and CRS Report RL33320, National Security Letters in Foreign Intelligence Investigations: Legal Background and Recent Amendments, by Charles Doyle.

Information Sharing Environment

Better Road Map Needed to Guide Implementation and Investments

Recent planned and attempted acts of terrorism on U.S. soil underscore the importance of the government's continued need to improve information sharing

which is described as an approach for sharing terrorism-related information that may include any method determined necessary and appropriate. GAO was asked to assess to what extent the Program Manager for the ISE and agencies have (1) made progress in developing and implementing the ISE and (2) defined an enterprise architecture (EA) to support ISE implementation efforts. In general, an EA provides a modernization blueprint to guide an entity's transition to its future operational and technological environment. To do this work, GAO (1) reviewed key statutes, policies, and guidance; ISE annual reports; and EA and other best practices and (2) interviewed relevant agency officials.

The 2011 Annual Report on the DNI Information Sharing Environment

In the six years since the Congress called for the creation of the Information Sharing Environment (ISE), steady progress has been made to build a broad foundation for information sharing across the Federal Government, as well as with our state, local, and tribal partners, the private sector, and the international community. We have met many of our preliminary goals and milestones for sharing terrorism, homeland security, and weapons of mass destruction information – including those prescribed by Section 1016 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Protection Act of 2004, as amended, and those outlined in the 2007 National Strategy for Information Sharing. We are now building beyond the foundation to accelerate implementation of the ISE.

We detail many other areas of progress in this Report, including improving the interoperability of our nation's Sensitive But Unclassified (SBU) and Secret networks; successes by the Interagency Threat Assessment and Coordination Group to strengthen information sharing between the Intelligence Community and state, local, and tribal law enforcement; and the tireless work of the terrorist watchlisting and screening community to streamline and standardize processes for information sharing while protecting the privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties of individuals.

No More Secrets: Open Source Information and the Reshaping of U.S. Intelligence

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The battle for public access to open source intelligence may have been lost before most people even knew it began. “No More Secrets” is an academic work, not an expose. But it is an exceptionally stimulating one that brings the theoretical principles of organization management and communications theory to bear on intelligence policy in original and insightful ways.

Authorized Classification and Control Markings Register D'Ngdre] ; \$=\ dajf * zNj kagf ; &! D+) E Yq*()

(U) The Register identifies the authorized classification and control markings, abbreviations and portion marks for classified and unclassified intelligence and information. It provides the allowable vocabulary for all information markings and other non-IC markings to control the flow of information. The Register provides a list of the humanreadable syntax for these markings, regardless of medium (e.g., text, image, graphics, electronic documents including web page, etc.). Refer to the IC Chief Information Officer ICTechSpec 500.D.2 (current version), XML Data Encoding Specification for Information Security Marking Metadata for the machine readable syntax and business rules to encode information security marking metadata in XML.

The Perils of Prediction. Indian Intelligence and the Kargil Crisis D'Hj]e E Y' Y\] nYf \$; D90 K

Les espions de Philippe II d'Espagne (1527-1598) : une préfiguration des services secrets modernes

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Le roi Philippe II, un temps Philippe Ier du Portugal, fils de l'empereur Charles Quint (Charles Ier d'Espagne), mit en place, au cours de son règne, un réseau très développé d'espionnage et de renseignement qui contribua à fortifier cet empire sur lequel, comme le voulait la célèbre formule, « jamais le soleil ne se couchait ». L'espionnage occupa sous le règne de Philippe II une très grande place dans la politique royale, notamment dans le cadre des luttes d'influence des empires espagnol et ottoman.

[RETOUR AU SOMMAIRE](#)

..... PRIVATISATION DU RENSEIGNEMENT & DE LA SÉCURITÉ

Transforming Wartime Contracting – Controlling costs, reducing risks D>f YdJ] hgjl Lg ; gf_] kk

Americans’ “Can do!” response to the challenge of contingency operations is admirable, but human and financial resources have limits, and long-term costs are seldom considered when short-term plans are being framed. Much of the waste, fraud, and abuse revealed in Iraq and Afghanistan stems from trying to do too much, treating contractors as a free resource, and failing to adapt U.S. plans and U.S. agencies’ responsibilities to host-nation cultural, political, and economic settings. This final report to Congress summarizes the Commission’s work since 2008 and offers 15 strategic recommendations that it believes warrant prompt action. Delay and denial are not good options. There will be a next contingency, whether the crisis takes the form of overseas hostilities or domestic response to a national emergency like a mass-casualty terror attack or natural disaster.

NGOs and Nonstate Armed Actors DM á] \ KIYI] k Åklám] 'g^H] Y[]

Transnational nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have developed strategies to improve the diffusion of and general adherence to international norms among nonstate armed actors, with the goal of persuading armed actors to adapt their behavior accordingly. The ICRC offers trainings in international humanitarian law to armed actors that explain their responsibilities for protecting civilians in military operations. Geneva Call provides education on the effects of antipersonnel landmines and supports armed actors in their efforts to clear mined areas, destroy stockpiles, and provide victim assistance. The NGOs’ efforts in dealing with nonstate armed actors reveal limitations and problems but also offer new avenues for states and international organizations to engage with armed groups. With greater support from the international community, NGOs’ contributions could become more substantive and complement other ongoing efforts to change armed actors’ behavior

[RETOUR AU SOMMAIRE](#)

..... FORCES ET OPÉRATIONS SPÉCIALES

Operation Neptune Spear – 2011

Osama bin Laden, the founder of the al-Qaeda organization responsible for the September 11 attacks in the United States, was killed by gunshot wounds to his head and chest on May 2, 2011, around 01:00 Pakistan Standard Time, in a 40-minute raid by United States special operations forces. The raid, code name Operation Neptune Spear also known as the Abbotabad Operation, took place at his safe house in Bilal Town, Abbottabad, Pakistan. At the conclusion of the raid, U.S. forces took bin Laden’s body to Afghanistan for identification before burying it at sea within 24 hours of his death.

In Conversation with Admiral Eric Olson

Discussion in ‘Special Operations Discussion’ Aug 9, 2011. Former SOCOM Commander Admiral Eric T. Olson sits down to discuss the role of Special Forces in the Global War on Terror with ABC News’ Martha Raddatz.

[RETOUR AU SOMMAIRE](#)

British Special Forces & The Fall Of Tripoli

With Tripoli now in the hands of the rebels, reports are coming in that are fleshing out the role of British special forces in the operation to take the city. There are thought to be less than 50 United Kingdom Special Forces (UKSF) operatives inside Libya, with around 30 soldiers from the 22nd Special Air Service (22 SAS), a detachment from the Special Reconnaissance Regiment (SRR) along with associated support elements. MI6 operatives are also said to be on the ground and working closely with UKSF.

[RETOUR AU SOMMAIRE](#)

GUERRE DE L'INFORMATION

Special Warfare - Popular Military

Special Operations as a Warfighting Function

SOF have played and will continue to play a major role in all facets of military operations, and it is imperative that all military leaders and planners understand SOF's capabilities and limitations. The challenges posed in recruiting, training and employing large forces that can operate in a manner similar to SOF are many and will not be addressed in this article. The author of this article understands that the necessity to understand special operations is in no way limited to the Army, but the article will address Army doctrine only, in order to address and foster discussion on the inclusion of special operations into the Army's warfighting functions, or WfFs.

The Future of MISO

A review of PSYOP's history; taking a brief look at definitions; showing the relationships of PSYOP to public affairs, or PA; information operations, or IO, and public diplomacy, or PD; and suggesting new ways we might think about PSYOP. Although PSYOP has been repeatedly misunderstood and misrepresented, MISO, as a means of informing and influencing foreign audiences, is as relevant in peace as in war and is vital to our nation's defense. This discussion is intended to create a dialogue that may generate solutions to the unresolved issues and serve as the beginning of a more comprehensive definition of MISO as a force and capability.

Information Operations as a Deterrent to Armed Conflict

Information operations core military capabilities include electronic warfare, computer network operations, psychological operations, military deception, and operations security. When properly coordinated and closely focused, these capabilities can deter armed conflict. Information operations' primary goal at the strategic level is to coerce a key leader or group of leaders to forgo a particular action or, alternatively, take an action consistent with U.S. interests.

[RETOUR AU SOMMAIRE](#)

CYBERMENACES

Department Of Defense Strategy For Operating In Cyberspace

DoD, working with its interagency and international partners, seeks to mitigate the risks posed to U.S. and allied cyberspace capabilities, while protecting and respecting the principles of privacy and civil liberties, free expression, and innovation that have made cyberspace an integral part of U.S. prosperity and security. How the Department leverages the opportunities of cyberspace, while managing inherent uncertainties and reducing vulnerabilities, will significantly impact U.S. defensive readiness and national security for years to come.

Air Force Instruction 51-402 – 27 July 2011 – Legal Reviews Of Weapons And Cyber Capabilities

The Obama Administration's Cybersecurity Proposal: Criminal Provisions

Responding to ongoing concerns over the state of U.S. cybersecurity, the Obama Administration released a report containing a proposal for significant cybersecurity legislation on May 12, 2011. The Administration's proposal contains seven sections and addresses many different subject areas. This report examines the first section of the Administration's proposal, dealing with criminal law. That section would supplement the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) by adding a mandatory three-year minimum penalty for damaging certain critical infrastructure computers, increase the penalties for most violations of the CFAA, modify the conspiracy and forfeiture provisions of the CFAA, and make felony violation of the CFAA a racketeering predicate offense.

Revealed: Operation Shady RAT

An investigation of targeted intrusions into more than 70 global companies, governments, and non-profit organizations during the last five years. What we have witnessed over the past five to six years has been nothing short of a historically unprecedented transfer of wealth — closely guarded national secrets (including those from classified government networks), source code, bug databases, email archives, negotiation plans and exploration details for new oil and gas field auctions, document stores, legal contracts, supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) configurations, design schematics, and much more has "fallen off the truck" of numerous, mostly Western companies and disappeared in the ever-growing electronic archives of dogged adversaries.

[RETOUR AU SOMMAIRE](#)

Defense Department Cyber Efforts: Definitions, Focal Point, and Methodology Needed for DOD to Develop Full-Spectrum Cyberspace Budget Estimates

This letter discusses the Department of Defense's (DOD) cyber and information assurance budget for fiscal year 2012 and future years defense spending. The objectives of this review were to (1) assess the extent to which DOD has prepared an overarching budget estimate for full-spectrum cyberspace operations across the department; and (2) identify the challenges DOD has faced in providing such estimates. The President has identified the cyber threat as one of the most serious national security challenges that the nation faces. In February 2011 the Deputy Secretary of Defense said that more than 100 foreign intelligence agencies have tried to breach DOD computer networks, and that one was successful in breaching networks containing classified information. To aid its efforts in countering cyberspace threats, DOD established the U.S. Cyber Command in 2010 and is currently undertaking departmentwide efforts to defend against cyber threats. DOD has defined some key cyber-related terms.

RETOUR AU SOMMAIRE

TERRORISME

Uyghur Unrest in Xinjiang Shakes Sino-Pakistani Relations

It has been a difficult summer for China's restive western province Xinjiang. A series of incidents characterized as terrorism have struck two of the province's cities, causing death, destruction and ethnic tension. This picture was further complicated when the government of the city of Kashgar published a statement online that claimed at least one of the perpetrators had been trained in Pakistan (Xinhua, August 1). The allegation by Chinese officials cast a shadow over Sino-Pakistani relations, a bilateral relationship that had been characterized in Kashgar just the month before by Pakistani Ambassador to China Masood Khan as "higher than mountains, deeper than oceans, stronger than steel, sweeter than honey, and dearer than eyesight".

Terrorism Financing and the Turkish Narcotics Trade

Terrorist groups operate like many businesses: they focus on activities where the transaction of money and logistical supply cannot be disrupted easily. To ensure a continuous flow of financial support, terrorist groups rely on various methods to devise schemes for making money. This varies from forming organized crime groups to controlling extortion mafias, hiring notable fraudsters as finance managers to getting commission from human traffickers. Terrorist groups commit almost any form of crime to sustain their livelihood, and in Turkey, one money making scheme is more profitable and significant than the others: the narcotics trade.

Critical Infrastructures: Background, Policy, and Implementation

This report discusses in more detail the evolution of a national critical infrastructure policy and the institutional structures established to implement it. The report highlights five issues of Congressional concern: identifying critical assets; assessing vulnerabilities and risks; allocating resources; information sharing; and regulation. This report will be updated.

African Counter-Terrorism Legal Frameworks a Decade After 2001

Ratification of the many counterterrorism conventions and protocols is the cornerstone of global efforts against terrorism. Africa's generally low rates of ratification can be explained by political and capacity related factors, including that states do not see counter-terrorism as a sufficient priority and resist the manner in which the agenda is presented. Ratification matters, but those promoting counterterrorism measures must be more honest about what is likely and more humble about what is possible. Rather than pursuing a checklist approach to satisfying UN commitments, counter-terrorism strategy in Africa should include efforts to build foundational law enforcement, cooperation and prosecution capacity and embed human rights values.

Haqqani Network Growing Stronger at the Expense of the Tehrik-e-Taliban

The Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) seems to be slowly disintegrating as various commanders try to pull it in different directions. A clear indication of this process came when the TTP Commander in the Kurram Agency, Fazal Saeed Haqqani, announced that his group had seceded from the TTP (for Fazal Saeed Haqqani, see Militant Leadership Monitor, July 2011). Fazal Saeed Haqqani also announced the formation of a new group called Tehrik-e-Taliban Islami Pakistan (TTIP) (Dawn [Karachi] June 28). Haqqani said his group was not happy with the TTP's policy of attacking civilian targets, a major reason for the split. However, Haqqani and his group have been involved in the murders of innocent Shi'a Muslims. In the very first statement to dissociate his new group from the TTP, Haqqani announced that his group would not carry out any attacks on the Pakistani security forces (The News [Karachi] June 28). He also announced that the United States is the TTIP's "main enemy" (Daily Times [Lahore] June 28).

An Extended Profile of the Pakistani Taliban

In a rare look at the decentralized structural organization of the group, particularly the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the brief discloses the group's operations, tactics and strategies. Qazi goes on to discuss the history and background of the conflict in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan, address the ideology of the Pakistani Taliban, and explain the essential characteristics of the movement. The report also looks into the group's recruitment patterns including the social factors that pull in recruits, and the tactics of teen abduction used to reinforce membership.

RETOUR AU SOMMAIRE

Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb *Ḍ:] f I] j ' ʻ g j K I j Y I] _ ḍ Y f \ Ḍ I] j f Y l a g f Y d K I m ḍ k*
 Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) emerged from a decades-long militant Islamist tradition in Algeria. In 1998, the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat, or GSPC) broke away from the Armed Islamic Group (Groupe Islamique Armé, or GIA) because of the GIA's extensive targeting of civilians. Gradually, the GSPC evolved to encompass global jihadist ideology in addition to its historical focus on overturning the Algerian state. In 2006, the GSPC officially affiliated with al Qaeda core, soon rebranding itself as al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. In the following years, AQIM was able to conduct a small number of large-scale attacks, most notably its 2007 bombing of the UN headquarters in Algiers. In recent years, counterterrorism pressure and weak governance have combined to shift the center of AQIM's presence to the Sahara-Sahel region. AQIM continues to make its presence known through smuggling operations, kidnappings, and clashes with security forces in the desert. In the coming years, general instability within the region could allow AQIM to further expand its influence.

Getting the Caucasus Emirate Right *Ḍ: KAK*
 This report aims to set straight a rather distorted record. It demonstrates the veracity of three vitally important facts usually obfuscated in discussions of the subject: (1) the longstanding and growing ties between the CE and its predecessor organization, the ChRI, on the one hand, and al Qaeda (AQ) and the global jihad, on the other hand; (2) the importance of the CE jihadi terrorist network as a united and organized political and military force promoting jihad in the region; and (3) the salience of local cultural and the Salafist jihadist theo-ideology and the influence of the global jihadi revolutionary movement/alliance as key, if not the main, factors drive the “violence in the North Caucasus.”

Le Groupe islamiste de combat libyen *Ḍ: > * J \$ z j ḍ <] f † [† \$ f g l] \ Ḍ [I n Y ḍ † † f i * - - \$ Y g . I * ()*
 Le Groupe islamique de combat libyen (GICL) a été fondé en Afghanistan, au début des années 1990, par des moudjahidines libyens, vétérans de la guerre soviéto-afghane, restés sur place à l'issue du conflit. Son existence n'a toutefois été officiellement annoncée qu'en 1995. Le GICL est inscrit sur la liste noire des organisations terroristes par le Conseil de sécurité de l'ONU.

[RETOUR AU SOMMAIRE](#)

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PROLIFÉRATION ET TRAFIC D'ARMES

Weighing the Impact of the Nuclear Suppliers Group's New Guidelines *Ḍ: q ' e e Y D] [Y n Y ḍ j*
 On June 23-24, the 46 members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), a multinational consortium of nuclear technology suppliers that aims to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, decided to tighten its guidelines on the transfer of sensitive enrichment and reprocessing technologies.

Transit and trans-shipment controls in an arms trade treaty *Ḍ: H Y m ḍ @ g d l g e Y f \ E Y j c : j g e ḍ q \$ K A U A*
 This paper provides an overview of existing international and regional agreements and best practices for controls on transit and trans-shipment. It discusses national implementation and enforcement of transit controls, paying particular attention to licensing and authorization, record keeping and information sharing as areas where an ATT could contribute to enhancing transit controls and their enforcement. A case study from the United Arab Emirates shows how 16 000 handguns and related ammunition worth more than \$4 million were mislabelled to evade transfer controls when travelling through several states. The case study also shows how arms transfer control legislation can be effectively utilized to pursue a criminal case against those involved, but that more international cooperation is needed to ensure that all of the parties involved in such activities are held accountable for their actions.

Combating Nuclear Smuggling. DHS has Developed a Strategic Plan for its Global Nuclear Detection Architecture, but Gaps Remain *Ḍ? 9G*
 We are pleased to be here today to discuss our past work examining the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) progress and efforts in planning, developing, and deploying its global nuclear detection architecture (GNDA). The overall mission of the GNDA is to use an integrated system of radiation detection equipment and interdiction activities to combat nuclear smuggling in foreign countries, at the U.S. border, and inside the United States. Terrorists smuggling nuclear or radiological material into the United States could use these materials to make an improvised nuclear device or a radiological dispersal device (also called a “dirty bomb”). The detonation of a nuclear device in an urban setting could cause hundreds of thousands of deaths and devastate buildings and physical infrastructure for miles. While not as damaging, a radiological dispersal device could nonetheless cause hundreds of millions of dollars in socioeconomic costs as a large part of a city would have to be evacuated—and possibly remain inaccessible—until an extensive radiological decontamination effort was completed. Accordingly, the GNDA remains our country's principal strategy in protecting the homeland from the consequences of nuclear terrorism.

[RETOUR AU SOMMAIRE](#)

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CRIMINALITÉ ET MAFIAS

Countering Piracy at Sea: Use of Force a Solution? *Ḍ: q B Y f] ; ` Y f \$ J K A K*
 The use of military means to free hijacked ships in the Gulf of Aden off the Somalia coast, though successful, has resulted in retaliative action. A comprehensive approach is required to deal with the piracy problem.

[RETOUR AU SOMMAIRE](#)

Maritime Security: Progress Made, but Further Actions Needed to Secure the Maritime Energy Supply

The nation's economy and security are heavily dependent on oil, natural gas, and other energy commodities. Al-Qa'ida and other groups with malevolent intent have targeted energy tankers and offshore energy infrastructure because of their importance to the nation's economy and national security. The U.S. Coast Guard--a component of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)--is the lead federal agency for maritime security, including the security of energy tankers and offshore energy infrastructure. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) also has responsibilities for preventing and responding to terrorist incidents. This testimony discusses the extent to which (1) the Coast Guard and the FBI have taken actions to address GAO's prior recommendations to prevent and respond to a terrorist incident involving energy tankers and (2) the Coast Guard has taken actions to assess the security risks to offshore energy infrastructure and related challenges. This testimony is based on products issued from December 2007 through March 2011 and recently completed work on the Coast Guard's actions to assess security risks. GAO reviewed documents from the Coast Guard's risk model and relevant laws, regulations, policies, and procedures; and interviewed Coast Guard officials.

The Interplay of Borders, Turf, Cyberspace, and Jurisdiction: Issues Confronting U.S. Law Enforcement

Savvy criminals constantly develop new techniques to target U.S. persons, businesses, and interests. Individual criminals as well as broad criminal networks exploit geographic borders, criminal turf, cyberspace, and law enforcement jurisdiction to dodge law enforcement countermeasures. Further, the interplay of these realities can potentially encumber policing measures. In light of these interwoven realities, policy makers may question how to best design policies to help law enforcement combat ever-evolving criminal threats. Congress may question how it can leverage its legislative and oversight roles to bolster U.S. law enforcement's abilities to confront modern-day crime. For instance, Congress may consider whether federal law enforcement has the existing authorities, technology, and resources—both monetary and manpower—to counter 21st century criminals. Congress may also examine whether federal law enforcement is utilizing existing mechanisms to effectively coordinate investigations and share information.

Weakness is a quality frequently ascribed to Latin American states. This diagnosis proves faulty since it is possible to find resistant structures inside those states that perpetuate such weaknesses. This article shows that this is the case in regards to the police force of the province of Buenos Aires. Here, I will demonstrate that the police have specialized in selling a service available to criminals and criminal organizations: illegal protection. With information taken from in-depth interviews and official documents, I will show that this protection – contrary to the views of Charles Tilly and Diego Gambetta – is characterized by a temporary suspension of the rule of law.

Local to global: reducing the risk from organised crime

Organised crime is a real problem that affects real people. Organised crime costs the UK between £20 and £40 billion pounds every year – its impact is felt by the state, businesses, communities, families and individuals. Through the strategy, the government has set out clear proposals for bringing together for the first time the work of those in the UK with a responsibility for tackling organised crime. On 8 June the government published its plan for the creation of a new National Crime Agency (NCA). When established, in 2013, the NCA will result in a step change in fighting organised crime, by creating the right structure at a national level to combat this threat.

Rapport d'activité 2010 – Tracfin
Ce rapport dresse un panorama sur l'année 2010 des risques émergents les plus récurrents en matière de blanchiment. Le développement de l'économie souterraine générateur d'une importante fraude fiscale et sociale apparaît comme une tendance forte de cette année, de même que le retour des escroqueries de type pyramide de Ponzi, le recours à des comptes collecteurs ou l'intensification de la cybercriminalité. Le service Tracfin est resté mobilisé en 2010 pour accomplir sa mission : contribuer à lutter contre le blanchiment d'argent et le financement du terrorisme. Vous pourrez également y retrouver l'essentiel de l'activité institutionnelle du service ainsi que les données chiffrées pour 2010.

Addressing Converging Threats to National Security

On July 25, 2011, the National Security Staff released its Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime. The Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime applies all elements of national power to protect citizens and U.S. national security interests from the convergence of 21st century transnational criminal threats. This Strategy is organized around a single unifying principle: to build, balance, and integrate the tools of American power to combat transnational organized crime and related threats to national security—and to urge our foreign partners to do the same. The end-state we seek is to reduce transnational organized crime (TOC) from a national security threat to a manageable public safety problem in the United States and in strategic regions around the world. The Strategy will achieve this end-state by pursuing five key policy objectives. The Strategy also introduces new and innovative capabilities and tools, which will be accomplished by prioritizing within the resources available to affected departments and agencies.

Le trafic d'héroïne, tradition ancestrale du crime organisé

L'héroïne, qui est tirée du pavot à opium (en résumé : pavot-opium-morphine-héroïne) après traitement chimique, est la drogue qui génère le plus de bénéfices pour les trafiquants du monde criminel. Il est à noter que les produits opiacés peuvent être consommés de différentes manières : fumés, inhalés, avalés ou injectés. Ce trafic qui est très ancien reste aujourd'hui la valeur sûre de la criminalité organisée.

IP Crime annual report 2010-2011

This year's intellectual property (IP) crime report (the Report) continues to focus on the activities of those involved in combating IP crime over the past year. The Report does not provide any measurement as to the scale and impact of IP crime on the UK economy, but it does illustrate industry estimates and information from seizures of counterfeit products. The annual survey of trading standards authorities (Chapter 3 of the Report) canvassed evidence from those who most regularly enforce copyright and trade marks. There were 94 responses to the survey from 88 different trading standards authorities. This represents almost 50% of all authorities in the UK and helps provide a national assessment to the current threat of IP crime. The survey provides a variety of information, including data on types of products being copied, the distribution channels and associated criminality.

Rapport de la DIA, 2^e semestre 2010

La Direction des Investigations Antimafia italiana a publié son rapport semestriel. Cosa Nostra traverse actuellement une crise suite à une série d'arrestations de parrains d'importance. L'organisation est en train de se restructurer par le bas par des nouvelles alliances entre familles (qui nécessite de consolider la pression criminelle sur le territoire). Mais la crise de leadership provoque un risque de volonté d'ascension criminelle rapide par la jeune génération, avec des risques de confrontation violente avec l'Etat. La 'Ndrangheta confirme son rôle dans le trafic internationale de stupéfiants. L'organisation calabraise a également réussi à infiltrer non seulement le tissu économique de Calabre, mais aussi de Lombardie et de Ligurie. En 2010, des tentatives de déstabilisations ont été effectuées contre la magistrature, notamment de Reggio de Calabre. La Camorra reste une organisation instable, trop fragmentée entre les différents clans rivaux. Exception notable : le clan des Casalesi, bien présent dans le tissu économique. Les groupes criminels des Pouilles adoptent de plus en plus une structuration mafieuse (rite d'initiation, assistance aux détenus,...) et augmente leur implantation territoriale.

Le scandale Faisán : des policiers espagnols accusés d'un mouchardage au bénéfice de l'ETA

Le scandale doit son nom au bar Faisán d'Irún (ville de Guipúzcoa située tout près de la frontière avec la France) ; un bar qui était la plaque tournante d'un réseau d'extorsion de fonds de l'ETA fondé sur « l'impôt révolutionnaire », prélevé de force auprès des entrepreneurs basques que ledit réseau a « démarché » par courrier entre mars 2005 et février 2006.

[RETOUR AU SOMMAIRE](#)

CONFLITS ARMÉS

Aid and Conflict in Afghanistan – *Ajjf Ylajf Yd; jak ?jgnh*

After a decade of major security, development and humanitarian assistance, the international community has failed to achieve a politically stable and economically viable Afghanistan.

The Afghanistan Analyst Bibliography 2011

6th Edition - July 2011, Compiled by Christian Bleuer

Mains-d'œuvre africaines : un instrument au service de la politique intérieure et de la diplomatie libyennes

*DYnj] f[] '9\Y'9e e gnj\$; >*J \$Ljzrf] dZj] f;)*.

Libye : les problèmes ne font que commencer *D; >*J \$zjā <] f t[f\$!dgjādyg. I *()*

Le CNT n'a pas les moyens de tenir le pays, déstructuré par six mois de guerre, la libre circulation des armes et l'exacerbation des haines internes. Tout laisse craindre que les règlements de comptes (personnels, tribaux, régionaux, etc.) vont se multiplier et entraîner des rétorsions, car la Libye fonctionne largement sur le principe clanique. Les divergences entre les factions du CNT vont s'accroître tant pour des raisons conjoncturelles (ils ne sont plus unis contre l'ennemi commun) que pour l'orientation et le contrôle du pouvoir. Cette situation explosive n'est pas sans rappeler le contexte somalien des années 1990.

Libya: Policy Options for Transition – ; `YI` Ye `gnk] \$DzqY'Ogjcf_?jgnh J] hgjl 'D9m_nkl *()

This report is a summary of discussions that took place at a Chatham House Libya Working Group meeting on 18 August 2011. At a historic moment in Libya's future the group met to discuss policy options for transition, on the premise that the end game for Colonel Gaddafi's regime was approaching. Discussion focused on three main areas: the ongoing conflict; challenges of the transition; and questions of social and economic reconstruction. Key points that emerged from the meeting included: - Following Colonel Gaddafi's exit there will have to be immediate reengagement with the police in Tripoli to help bring about the restoration of civilian order. It seems there are already good communications in place to allow this to happen. - In the immediate post-conflict period there will be an urgent need to establish a process to collect weapons, as large sections of the civilian population will be left with arms. It is possible that financial incentives may be necessary for this process. - In order to restore the provision of basic services to the population the tactics currently being used by the rebels to pressure Tripoli – such as cutting off supplies – will need to be quickly reversed. - A key aspect of reconstruction will be the return of skilled expatriate and diaspora Libyans. The National Transitional Council (NTC) should consider explicitly inviting people back to help with reconstruction efforts.

[RETOUR AU SOMMAIRE](#)

Do Religious Factors Impact Armed Conflict? Empirical Evidence from Sub-Saharan Africa

Theoretically, the “mobilization hypothesis” establishes a link between religion and conflict by arguing that religious structures such as overlapping ethnic and religious identities are prone to mobilization; once politicized, escalation to violent conflict becomes likelier. Yet, despite the religious diversity in sub-Saharan Africa and the religious overtones in a number of African armed conflicts, this assumption has not yet been backed by systematic empirical research on the religion–conflict nexus in the region. The following questions thus remain: Do religious factors significantly impact the onset of (religious) armed conflict? If so, do they follow the logic of the mobilization hypothesis and, if yes, in which way? To answer these questions, this paper draws on a unique data inventory of all sub-Saharan countries for the period 1990–2008, particularly including data on mobilization-prone religious structures (e.g. demographic changes, parallel ethno-religious identities) as well as religious factors indicating actual politicization of religion (e.g. inter-religious tensions, religious discrimination, incitement by religious leaders). Based on logit regressions, results suggest that religion indeed plays a significant role in African armed conflicts. The findings are compatible with the mobilization hypothesis: Overlaps of religious and ethnic identities and religious dominance are conflict-prone; religious polarization is conflict-prone only if combined with religious discrimination and religious tensions.

RETOUR AU SOMMAIRE

RISQUES INTERNATIONAUX

Coordination in an Era of Fundamental Change in North Korea

Role of Arab militaries in popular uprisings

The structure and role of the armed forces in Egypt and Tunisia made the relatively peaceful overthrow of autocratic rulers in both countries the exception in the Middle East and North Africa. Similarly the structure of the military helps explain the violence in Libya, Syria and Yemen. It foreshadows worse violence in countries like Iran and Saudi Arabia should their regimes face similar uprisings.

Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2011

The United States recognizes and welcomes PRC contributions that support a safe and secure global environment. China’s steady integration into the global economy creates new incentives for partnership and cooperation, particularly in the maritime domain. Although China’s expanding military capabilities can facilitate cooperation in pursuit of shared objectives, they can also increase the risk of misunderstanding and miscalculation. Strengthening our military-to-military relationship is a critical part of our strategy to shape China’s choices as we seek to capitalize on opportunities for cooperation while mitigating risks. To support this strategy, the United States must continue monitoring PRC force development and strategy. In concert with our friends and Allies, the United States will also continue adapting our forces, posture, and operational concepts to maintain a stable and secure East Asian environment.

South China Sea: Reducing the China-Vietnam tension

The disputed South China Sea is a source of long-running tension and instability in Asia, worsened by controversial actions and sharp reactions by the various territorial claimants. There is a need for the peaceful resolution of disputes between China and Vietnam.

South China Sea Dispute: Why China takes Pragmatic Stance –

The recent ASEAN-China agreement on a set of guidelines to implement their 2002 declaration for a code of conduct in the South China Sea promises to narrow their disputes over territorial sovereignty. Why did China agree to the guidelines a decade after the declaration was adopted?

Deadly Detention: Deaths in Custody amid Popular Protest in Syria

At least 88 people are believed to have died in detention in Syria during five months of bloody repression of pro-reform protests, a new Amnesty International report reveals today. Deadly detention: Deaths in custody amid popular protest in Syria documents reported deaths in custody between April and mid-August in the wake of sweeping arrests. The 88 deaths represented a significant escalation in the number of deaths following arrest in Syria. In recent years Amnesty International has typically recorded around five deaths in custody per year in Syria.

RETOUR AU SOMMAIRE

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