Truthout, 23 décembre 2004

Our two compatriots' liberation is incontestably the best news of this year-end. Iraq's chaotic situation and the anarchic structure of the Iraqi Resistance considerably complicated the task of diplomacy and of the French services charged with contacting the kidnappers.

Since Autumn 2004 and the preparation of the offensive against Falluja, American intelligence has succeeded in reconstructing the physiognomy of the Iraqi insurrection, thanks to the experience they've acquired in eighteen months, to an improvement in Iraqi forces' intelligence-gathering capacities (and in spite of their infiltration by the guerilla movement), and to tight collaboration with Jordanian secret services.

The Iraqi guerilla movement is composed of over fifty independent active cells. It's a resistance with multiple faces, composed of groups each of which has different reasons to fight the Americans or Iyad Allawi's government.

There is no charismatic resistance leader and no tendency towards unification of the different groups. Among the leaders of the guerilla movement, one finds former fighters from Saddam's forces, religious and tribal leaders, as well as neighborhood big shots or gang leaders. Islamists and former Baath Party cadres cohabit even within different armed factions. This diversity of causes and interests leads to many local arrangements and marriages of circumstance that have long disrupted understanding of the phenomenon.

The fighting strength of the guerilla is estimated today as between 8,000 and 20,000 men, a number that goes up to 20,000 people once active sympathizers charged with intelligence and logistical support are added in. In this total, the number of foreign fighters would amount to as many as 1,000 people, essentially drawn from Syria, Palestine, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia, but also from Western Europe.

Even though the Americans have eliminated dozens of resistance cadres, it seems that their ranks are prone to constant renewal since the GIs' many blunders have pushed many Iraqis into the opposition. The new leaders, however, are generally less qualified than their predecessors. From this web of factions, a dozen main groups emerge: Ansar al-Islam (created in December 2001 in Iraqi Kurdistan and very connected to Iran); Ansar al-Sunna (which kidnapped and killed 12 Nepalese on August 23, 2004), the Khalid bin al-Walid brigade (suspected of having kidnapped and assassinated the Italian journalist Enzo Baldoni, in August 2004); les Assadullah brigades; the Saladin Front of the Iraqi Islamic Resistance; the Sayf Allah al-Maslu brigades (which have conducted dozens of operations against American forces in the Niwi province); the Black Banner Group (a Sunni movement very active in Falluja); and the Islamic Army in Iraq (which released Iranian consul Feredion Jahani and the two French journalists).

The two most dangerous and structured movements are Jaysh Muhammad, which is most notoriously responsible for the August 2003 attack against the UN in Baghdad and has been very active in Falluja fighting against American forces, and Al Tawhid wal Jihad, Abu Mussab al-Zarqawi's terrorist group, which would comprise between 1,000 and 1,500 fighters, a third of whom are foreigners. This movement has divided the Iraqi theatre into nine zones of operation where its fighters are deployed: Mosul, Anbar, Baghdad, Samara, Al Diayli, Al Qaem and Falluja, where its headquarters used to be. Al Tawhid wal Jihad has tried for several months to develop staging bases in Syria and Jordan so as to extend its operations beyond Iraq.

The different elements of this guerilla movement seem to have unlimited funds available through a clandestine network directed by former Baath Party cadres faithful to Saddam Hussein, since only half the billion dollars Saddam placed in Syrian banks before the war has been recuperated by the Pentagon. Many former Baathists and Saddam family members have taken refuge in Syria and are actively involved in arms trafficking and supporting the rebels in Sunni country. Financing also comes from rich Saudi donors and Islamic charity organizations, since the Saudi government does not do everything necessary to block funds transfers from its banks.

The suicide attacks committed in Iraq since March 2003 have killed more than 700 people, more than were killed in Israel in almost three and a half years (475 victims in 112 attacks). Moreover, the guerilla movements have kidnapped more than 150 foreigners. Most have been exchanged for ransom, but 28 have been murdered by their abductors¹. The "standard" price for conducting a bomb attack on an American or police convoy is $100-$300, which is a lot in a country where many former soldiers are unemployed. During the just completed Ramadan period, there was a 25% increase in the number of violent acts.

The actions undertaken by French diplomatic and secret services in this chaotic a context were consequently extremely difficult. Whatever action was at the source of the two journalists' liberation, it is appropriate to salute the complex and dangerous work effected on the ground over close to four months by all those who worked in the shadows.

Éric Denécé is Director of the French Center for Intelligence Research. Latest book published: "Al-Qaeda, Les Nouveaux Réseaux de la terreur," [Al-Qaeda, the New Terror Networks] Ellipses, 2004

Truthout, 23 décembre 2004

¹ Alexis Debat, "Vivisecting the Jihad, (part II)", The National Interest, October 2004.